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Is a Presidential Item Veto
Constitutional?
Paul R.Q. Wolfson
Congress' budget process is currently under attack. Critics charge that
Congress is so unable to resist the influence of special interests and the
concern with re-election that it loads appropriation bills with "pork-
barrel" spending projects that are fiscally irresponsible and valuable to
only a few.' As a solution to the perceived congressional aversion to fiscal
discipline, members of Congress, influential voices in the press, and Presi-
dent Reagan have suggested that Congress grant the President an "item-
veto" power over appropriation bills.' With this authority the President
could veto wasteful parts of appropriation bills while consenting to the
remainder.
The Constitution explicitly grants the President veto power only over
bills;3 it is silent as to any such power over parts of bills. Due to the
difficulty of amending the Constitution, members of Congress have intro-
duced three types of legislation designed to create an item veto by statute.
The "conventional" item veto would allow the President to veto directly
parts of appropriation bills. 4 The "impoundment" item veto would grant
1. See, e.g., Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, 14 PREs. STUD. Q. 183, 183
(1984); Dixon, The Case for the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTiE DAME J.L. ETHics & Pus. PoL'Y 207,
211-17 (1985).
2. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. S9873 (daily ed. July 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); Res-
cue the Senate.!, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 34, col. I (editorial); 132 CONG. REC. S1050 (daily ed.
Feb. 5, 1986) (State of the Union message from President Reagan). Although the item veto probably
had substantial support in the 99th Congress, see 131 CONG. REC. S9878 (daily ed. July 23, 1985)
(57 of required 60 Senators voting for cloture resolution to break filibuster against item-veto bill), the
resumption of Democratic control over the Senate has undoubtedly made passage of an item-veto bill
less likely. See Budget Reform: A Red Herring for Red Ink, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at I, col. 5
(White House aide conceding that item veto "will 'never, never, never, never, never' pass Congress");
President Will Seek Alternatives to System of Budget Preparation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1986, at
Al, col. 2 (item veto unlikely to gain needed congressional support). Not all of the item veto's support-
ers are conservative Republicans, however, see 131 CoNG. REc. S9873 (daily ed. July 23, 1985)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy supporting item veto); nor are all of the item veto's opponents liberal
Democrats. See 131 CONG. REc. S9939 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Hatch opposing
item veto).
3.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign
it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall . . . proceed to reconsider it.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
4. S. 1921, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in Line-Item Veto: Hearings on S.J. Res. 26,
S.J. Res. 178, and S. 1921 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
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the President discretion to decide which funds to spend after he has signed
an appropriation bill.5 A "rules" item veto would make the current presi-
dential veto power more effective through new internal congressional pro-
cedures designed to partition appropriation bills into many separate bills
for presentment to the President.6 Despite the substantial shift in power
that any of these three measures would effect, neither supporters nor op-
ponents of the item veto have attempted to develop the constitutional argu-
ments in favor of and against the three types of bills.7
This Note will first assess a key argument of the item veto's supporters,
that Congress' practice of enacting huge appropriation bills, often with
nongermane riders, has encroached upon the presidential veto power and
that the item veto is necessary to restore the constitutionally appropriate
balance. It will show that this view is incorrect, that the nation's colonial
and revolutionary constitutional arrangements as well as events during the
framing of the Constitution demonstrate that the Framers were familiar
with detailed and complex appropriation bills, including ones with riders.
Moreover, because money bills passed by the lower houses of the colonial
legislatures were unamendable by the upper houses or by the Crown, the
Framers must have known that the President would be able to veto appro-
priation bills only with great difficulty. The Note will then argue that,
given the intent of the Framers that the legislature should control govern-
ment appropriations, the "conventional" and "impoundment" item vetoes
would improperly delegate legislative power to the executive branch. Fi-
nally, in considering the "rules" item veto, it will show that, although
Congress may have the power to enact such a mechanism, it must fail as a
legal means of binding Congress to a regime of fiscal restraint, because
either house could renounce the "rules" item veto at any time, without the
consent of the other house or of the President.
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Hearing].
5. H.R. 4774, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
6. S. 43, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985), reprinted in Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the
Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hear-
ings]. The terms "conventional," "impoundment," and "rules" used to describe the item-veto propos-
als are introduced in this Note.
7. By contrast, policy assessments of the item veto, i.e., inquiries as to whether the item veto
would succeed in reducing the federal budget deficit, abound. See generally Symposium on the Line-
Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 157 (1985). The line between policy analysis
and constitutional analysis can blur, especially if the latter is reduced essentially to the question of
whether the item veto would give the President too much power. Although this is an important ques-
tion, the answer cannot definitively settle the issue of the constitutionality of the item veto if the
answer that one gives depends on whether one thinks that Congress, or the President, currently exer-
cises too much power. Asking whether a particular proposal would give "too much" or "too little"
power will never yield the proper answer unless there is a point at which the distribution of power
will be "just right."
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I. THE ITEM VETO AS THREAT TO LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. The Historical Background of the Appropriation Power
Supporters of the item veto argue that, whereas the Framers "intended
to institutionalize the veto as part of the ordinary lawmaking process,"'
Congress has encroached on the presidential veto power. Congress now
shields questionable items from executive review by presenting huge ap-
propriation bills to the President. This practice annuls the Framers' in-
tention that the President could use the veto to turn aside unwise legisla-
tion, for he cannot exercise such a power at the cost of denying funds to
the whole government.' Because the President can veto only entire bills,
Congress can also force the President to accept nongermane riders that
probably would be vetoed if presented separately.10
The premise of the item veto's supporters, that the Framers were una-
ware of either omnibus appropriation bills or nongermane riders and
would thus favor the item veto to redress the imbalance of power caused
by these congressional incursions, is flawed."1 Both techniques are conso-
8. Best, supra note 1, at 187; see also 1984 Hearing, supra note 4, at 173 (statement of Secre-
tary of Treasury Donald Regan); Ross & Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President?, 12 PREs.
STUD. Q. 66, 67 (1982). Contra R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 159 (1935) (before Presidency of
Andrew Jackson, veto was used only to reject legislation that in President's opinion was unconstitu-
tional or defectively drafted); Black, Some Thoughts on tie Veto, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1976, at 87 (Framers probably intended such limited use of veto). The item veto's supporters argue
that the Framers intended the veto to serve two purposes: to provide the President with a check
against legislative usurpation of executive powers, and to force the reconsideration of possibly unwise
laws. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (veto gives Presi-
dent power to resist legislative encroachment); THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (veto furnishes "additional security against the enaction of improper laws"). A key
assumption of the item veto's supporters is that the President's role in turning aside unwise legislation
stems from his ability to represent the national interest in reviewing legislation as opposed to the
tendency of members of Congress to respond to special and local interests and to accommodate these
interests through log-rolling. See Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to
Legislation, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 60, 60-61 (1965); Ross & Schwengel, supra, at 66-67; Shepsle, The
Congressional Budget Process: Diagnosis, Prescription, Prognosis, in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING
210 (W. Wander, F. Hebert & G. Copeland eds. 1984).
9. 1984 Hearing, supra note 4, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Hatch (quoting President Eisen-
hower)); id. at 42 (statement of Sen. Mattingly).
10. Givens, supra note 8, at 62. A fascinating twist on the rider occurred in the 99th Congress
when House Democrats tried to attach legislation to an appropriation bill that was certain to be
vetoed in order to kill the legislation. The appropriation bill was an enormous supplemental measure,
described by Representative Michel as a "great, bursting barrel of rancid pork," 132 CONG. REC.
H1824 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1986); the rider authorized aid to the Nicaraguan "contra" rebels. Id. The
Democrats' attempt to join the two issues led to near-anarchy in the House. See 44 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 835 (1986).
11. See Best, supra note 1, at 187 (Framers unaware of such devices); Ross & Schwengel, supra
note 8, at 68 (same); Note, Separation of Powers: Congressional Riders and the Veto Power, 6 U.
MIc H. J.L. REF. 735, 738 (1973) (same). The University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Note
(which opposes a veto of nongermane riders) offers as the first congressional rider the amendment of
the bill admitting Maine to statehood by a resolution to admit Missouri. Id. at 738 & n.22. This
demonstrates the difficulty of assessing the "validity" of riders. Although the merits of admitting the
two states ought perhaps to have been considered separately, this early example of log-rolling was
essential to the preservation of the union. Cf. R. LuCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 548-49 (1922)
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nant with the Framers' understanding, informed by the colonial experi-
ence, that the executive should veto appropriation bills only with great
difficulty. The absence of any special presidential veto power over spend-
ing measures proves not that the Framers were oblivious to the threat of
legislative aggrandizement, but that they thought that congressional con-
trol over appropriations served as a crucial check against misgovernment
by the executive.12 Most importantly, the Framers gave the President no
power over the content of appropriation bills even though they knew that
during the colonial period, the colonial assemblies' insistence that money
bills were unamendable once they had passed the lower house had greatly
facilitated the expansion of legislative power.
In the colonial era, British constitutional law required the consent of
the House of Commons for the taxation of the kingdom. By the late sev-
enteenth century, Commons had further established that it possessed the
sole right to initiate tax legislation-to the exclusion of the House of
Lords-and that tax bills passed by the Commons were unamendable in
the Lords. The Lords could only accept or reject the revenue bills in
toto.1s Nor could the king amend money bills; thus Commons in 1700
attached to a tax bill a rider annulling all the king's land grants in Ire-
land. Although the House of Lords resisted, William III agreed to the
passage of the bill, including the rider, for the sake of obtaining the
revenue.
14
The lower houses of the colonial legislatures self-consciously imitated
the British House of Commons in asserting their power of the purse. At
an early stage the lower houses asserted the privilege of unamendability as
well. 1 ' This privilege proved to be a crucial constitutional advantage for
(discussing how law of ancient Rome prohibiting legislation containing unrelated subjects led to out-
break of civil war between Marius and Sulla after Senate rejected omnibus reform package as defec-
tive in form). Similarly, pork-barrel appropriation is largely in the eye of the beholder. See D.
STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS 150-51 (1986) (discussing disagreement between OMB Di-
rector Stockman and Sen. Schmitt over NASA appropriations). The classic example of pork barrel is
the "water project," a large public works irrigation project usually located in the district of a powerful
member of Congress. See id. at 148 (Red River Barge Canal protected by Sen. Long). But even water
projects have their defenders. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. 18,915 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield)
(arguing that "[tihese are not so-called pork barrel projects. . . . [but] are capital investments in
water resource development"); 123 CONG. REC. 18,833 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Kemp) (seven water
projects in his district "necessary to the economic and social well-being of the Buffalo area").
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359 (. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
13. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 611 (10th ed. 1946).
14. See D. OGo, ENGLAND IN THE REIGNS OF JAMES II AND WILLIAM III 451-52 (1955).
15. The lower house of the New York Assembly rejected amendments offered by the upper house
as early as 1711. J. BURNS, CoNTRoVERSIES BErwEEN ROYAL GOVERNORS AND THEIR ASSEMBLIES
306-07 (1923); see also J. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY
IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES 1689-1776, at 66 (1963) (Virginia lower house rejected
amendments in 1711); J. POMFRL, COLONIAL NEW JERSEY 139 (1973) (New Jersey lower house
rejected amendments in 1719).
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the colonial Commons in their struggles for power with the royal gover-
nors, especially for control of the colonial fisc.' 6
The British government at first maintained that the colonial legislatures
had a role to play only in the taxing side of fiscal matters and that all
spending decisions rested in the royal prerogative.1 7 But fearing the estab-
lishment of a foreign-born (British) bureaucracy at the expense of colonial
tax money,"' the colonial legislatures learned that they could control dis-
bursements as well as revenues by stipulating in tax bills the purposes for
which the monies they granted would be used. 9 As they customarily en-
acted taxing acts every year, they developed the practice of passing com-
bined yearly taxing and spending measures for the support of the entire
government.20
16. 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 764
(E. O'Callaghan ed. 1855) [hereinafter NEW YORK DOCUMENTS] (letter from Gov. Clinton to Board
of Trade complaining that unamendability gave lower house of New York Assembly "undue influ-
ence" over colonial government).
17. See J. GREENE, supra note 15, at 65-67.
18. See 6 NEW YORK DOCUMENTS, supra note 16, at 554-56 (letter from Gov. Clinton to Board
of Trade discussing popular suspicion that governor had converted tax revenues to private use; assem-
bly's control over appropriations described as encroachment on royal prerogative).
19. The lower house of the Pennsylvania legislature claimed the right to control disbursements as
early as 1694. J. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 88 (1966).
20. Unamendability also gave the colonial lower houses leverage against the British Privy Coun-
cil, which exercised a reserve power to disallow colonial legislation beyond the governor's veto. The
Privy Council exercised no item veto but always either approved legislation in full or disallowed it in
full. See Flippin, The Royal Government in Virginia, 84 COLUM. STUD. HIsr. ECON. & PUB. L. 1,
202 (1919). See generally Russell, The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in
Council, 64 COLUM. STUD. HIST. ECoN. & PUB. L. 421 (1915). Because the Privy Council could
disallow a law at any time after its enactment, the British government sometimes allowed legislation
with objectionable parts to operate for a time, during which period the governor could try to secure a
repeal of the defects. If he could not, the Privy Council could then disallow the law. Id. at 474-76.
In 1760, the Board of Trade sought legal advice as to whether the British government could disal-
low parts of colonial legislation. 4 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES
440 (J. Munro ed. 1911); Russell, supra, at 626. The Privy Council had once, in 1680, disallowed
one clause of a Virginia revenue act exempting ships built in Virginia or owned by Virginians from
export duties on tobacco. 2 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES 11 (W.
Grant & J. Munro eds. 1910); Russell, supra, at 449. However this disallowance of 1680 took place
under an early and unstable constitutional regime, in which the crown was trying to assume for itself
the power to write and enact legislation, subject to the assent of the legislature. See L. LABAREE,
ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 219-22 (1930). The crown's attempt to expand the royal prerog-
ative to include the power to write colonial legislation failed primarily due to resistance from the
colonial legislature of Jamaica, and the colonial constitution settled with legislative initiative in the
assembly and power of assent in the crown.
That colonial legislatures took seriously their power to appropriate in detail is shown by the 1763
Georgia appropriation act, which provided £1800 for the support of the government during the year,
including such accounts as £12 for a tree for the lighthouse, £5 for fire and candles for the General
Assembly, £2 for irons for Spanish prisoners, and £1 10s 2d for messenger services. Flippin, The
Royal Government of Georgia: The Financial System and Administration, 1752-1776, 9 GA. Hisr.
Q. 187, 196 n.18 (1925); see also Bullock, The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789,
with Especial Reference to the Budget, 1 BULL. U. Ws. ECON. POL. SCI. & HIsT. SERIES 117,
216-19 (1895) (discussing colonial practice of appropriating in detail).
For an excellent discussion of one item of appropriation that was too objectionable to be accepted by
a governor, namely a financial contribution by the legislature of South Carolina to the political cam-
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Unamendability meant that the colonial governors and upper houses
had either to accept all the items of appropriation in the money bills or
reject them all, risking confrontation with the lower house and denial of
revenue.21 In fact, the lower houses did not hesitate to deny funding to the
colonial governments on several occasions. 2 Resistance by royal governors
to the lower houses' control over disbursements proved ineffectual.23
Once the governors conceded the spending power to the legislatures, the
lower houses used the power to control indirectly other powers previously
presumed to lie within the royal prerogative. The South Carolina House
of Commons was particularly aggressive in asserting control over the mili-
tary by enacting appropriations so highly detailed as to curb most guber-
natorial discretion."4 In many colonies the lower houses virtually usurped
the appointment power by making appropriations for individuals rather
than offices.25
Thus the colonial legislatures used unamendability to establish their
right to judge the propriety of all expenditures2" and to curb executive
power. They attempted to use unamendability to secure the passage of
nongermane riders as well. Although royal governors had strict instruc-
tions not to assent to bills containing riders,27 the legislatures tried the
device, and occasionally the colonial governments went without funding
while the governor and representatives struggled for power.28
paign of John Wilkes, one of the greatest enemies of George III, see Greene, Bridge to Revolution:
The Wilkes Fund Controversy in South Carolina, 1769-1775, 29 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 19 (1963).
"21. J. BURNS, supra note 15, at 103, 262-63, 300.
22. See J. POMFRET, supra note 15, at 161 (New Jersey colonial officials not paid salaries for
three years). Driven to distraction by intransigent assemblies, royal governors frequently had to dis-
solve colonial legislatures without a successful vote on appropriations. See, e.g., 6 NEW YORK DOCU-
MENTs, supra note 16, at 282, 286-88 (letters from Gov. Clinton to Board of Trade discussing As-
sembly's unwillingness to appropriate for military expeditions); 1 THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
ROBERT DINWIDDIE 303 (A. Brock ed. 1883) (Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie chastising Virginia
Assembly for failure to appropriate funds for French and Indian War).
23. So complete was the South Carolina House of Commons' victory that a 1750 instruction from
the Board of Trade to the Governor of South Carolina ordering him to resist legislative attempts to
appropriate went unheeded. J. GREENE, supra note 15, at 89.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., J. BURNS, supra note 15, at 328 (New York).
26. For particularly eloquent expressions of this right by lower houses, see J. GREENE, supra
note 15, at 407, and J. MAIN, THE UPPER HOUSE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1763-1788, at 34
(1967); see also 6 NEW YORK DOCUMENTS, supra note 16, at 557 (letter from Gov. Clinton to Duke
of Bedford) ("the King can not command a single farthing").
27. L. LABAREE, supra note 20, at 222.
28. In 1715 the Virginia House of Burgesses tacked on to a bill for the purchase of supplies for
the defense of Carolina a provision repealing a much-disliked act authorizing government inspection
of tobacco; the Governor vetoed the bill. T. WERTENBAKER, GIVE ME LIBERTY 167 (1958). The
New York Assembly tried by means of a rider to a bill appropriating the salaries of judges in the
colony to effect a major constitutional change: establishing that judges would hold office during good
behavior and not at the King's pleasure. The upper house rejected the bill, and the judges were not
paid. J. BURNS, supra note 15, at 360-62; see 6 NEW YORK DOCUMENTS, supra note 16, at 63; cf. 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 273 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter M.
FARRAND] (Col. Mason discussing possibility that House would add nongermane riders to money
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During the Revolution, the supremacy of the lower houses in fiscal
matters was codified in several state constitutions that denied the upper
houses the right to amend money bills. 9 This conviction that the people's
direct representatives should control the purse had become so strong by
the time of the Constitutional Convention that the delegates considered
depriving the Senate of the right to amend tax or appropriation bills.30
The delegates at the Convention from the small states recognized, how-
ever, that establishing unamendability would give the House a crucial ad-
vantage over the Senate; thus they opposed unamendability as fatal to the
balance between the two houses.-" Moreover, Madison argued to the Con-
vention that unamendability would provoke conflict between the two
houses and suggested that such had been the experience in the states that
had adopted the principle. 2
Even though the Convention gave the Senate an equal share in the
power to write money legislation, thus establishing the Senate as a poten-
tial check on the misuse of money bills by the House,33 the Framers did
nothing, besides giving the President the ordinary veto power, to establish
the President as such a check on Congress. This omission is best under-
stood in light of the long history of struggle between the colonial legisla-
tures and governors over the content of spending bills. The Framers
granted the President no special veto power over appropriation bills, yet
they had experienced the confrontations between the branches of the colo-
nial governments that had resulted from vetoes of spending measures, and
they understood the advantage that power over spending had given the
colonial lower houses. Indeed they restated the principle of legislative con-
trol over disbursements by insisting in the Constitution that "[n]o Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law."'14 That a presidential veto can be exercised over appropri-
ation bills only with difficulty is consonant with the Framers' understand-
ing that the ability of the people to force government to heed their wishes
is most securely assured by the politically astute exercise of the fiscal pow-
ers by the legislature.
bills and suggesting that empowering Senate to amend them would defeat this practice).
29. See J. MAIN, supra note 26, at 107, 118, 129.
30. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 273. Edmund Randolph wished to deny the Senate the
power to amend money bills because he feared that the executive would have too much influence in
the Senate. 2 id. at 279.
31. 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 121 Ui.
Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1981); see 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 210-11 (opposition of
Maryland delegates); see also 1 id. at 527 (Madison remarking that "[i]f the Senate should yield to
the obstinacy of the 1st. branch the use of that body as a check would be lost[;] [i]f the 1st. branch
should yield to that of the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory").
32. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 224.
33. See supra notes 30-32.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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B. The Item Veto and the Nondelegation Doctrine
1. The Item Veto as Improper Delegation
Political developments in the colonial period and during the framing of
the Constitution established that Congress had authority over appropria-
tions for the federal government.3" A transfer of authority to the Presi-
dent, through either the "conventional" item veto or the "impoundment"
item veto, to decide which parts of appropriation bills to enforce, would be
a delegation of Congress' spending power." Such a delegation, however,
would be unconstitutional.
The principle of separation of powers prohibits Congress from abdicat-
ing its responsibility for primary policy-making in the federal govern-
ment. 37 Nonetheless, the delegation of legislative powers to executive and
administrative agencies is essential to the modern administrative state.3"
35. During the impoundment controversy of the 1970's, courts affirmed that power over spending
lay with the legislative branch. See Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492, 498 (4th
Cir. 1973), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 420 U.S. 136 (1975); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v.
Brinegar, 388 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1975); Guadamuz v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1973).
36. See J. Killian, Constitutionality of Empowering Item Veto by Legislation 15 (Congressional
Research Service Jan. 4, 1984).
37. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (describing delegation
of legislative powers by Congress as "breach of the National fundamental law"); see Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (arguing that Congress passed on to Secretary of Labor responsibility for deciding
whether statistical probability of future deaths from exposure to chemicals outweighed economic costs
of preventing those deaths).
38. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 33 (1965). The Supreme Court last struck down a federal
law on grounds of undue delegation to the executive branch in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). However, in National Cable TV Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S.
336, 340 (1974), the Court suggested that Congress cannot delegate the power to levy taxes. Thus in
FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974), a companion case to National Cable TV, the
Court invalidated fees levied by the FPC in proportion to utilities' wholesale sales because such fees
resembled taxes. The statute authorized administrative agencies to take into consideration the "public
policy" served by the regulation as well as administrative convenience and cost of regulation in setting
their fees. According to the Court, such valuation of public policy was a legislative function. The
Court virtually wrote the "public policy" clause out of the statute.
Despite arguments that the delegation doctrine is essentially dead, its revival as a means of forcing
legislatures to assume the task of making the hard policy decisions in a democracy has had remarkably
broad support, from Chief Justice Rehnquist, see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 671-88 (opinion concurring in judgment); on occasion from Justice
Brennan, see California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 91-93 (1974) (dissenting opinion);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269-77 (1967) (opinion concurring in result); but see FPC v.
New England Power Co., 415 U.S. at 352-54 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in
result) (arguing that delegation doctrine is as "moribund" as substantive due process); cf. McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 273-75 (1971) (dissenting opinion) (procedural safeguards more useful
than articulated standards in ensuring that delegated power is exercised fairly by officials); from Jus-
tice Scalia, see Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, REGULATION,
Nov./Dec. 1979, at 19, 23; from Judge Skelly Wright, see Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice
(Book Review), 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972); from John Hart Ely, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 133-34 (1980); and from Paul Gewirtz, see Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and
Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, LAW & COb'TMP. PROBs., Summer 1976, at
46, 49-65. The three-judge district court that held the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law uncon-
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The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress frequently is unable to
perform the entire function of legislating and must charge officials with
some of its tasks. A field may be too technical" or fast-changing 0 for
Congress to regulate directly; implementing a policy may require such
attention to detail that if Congress were required to do everything, it
would become so mired in specifics that it could not proceed to matters of
general importance.41
Such transfers of authority assume that the delegate will further Con-
gress' wishes in issuing regulations.42 They do not allow the delegate to
review the propriety of congressional legislation and to terminate pro-
grams if, in the delegate's independent judgment, they seem unwise.43 In-
deed, delegations of congressional power must be accompanied by "stan-
dards" or an "intelligible principle" to ensure that the delegate
implements Congress' will. 44 Courts will insist that officials not use the
stitutional, see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text, expressed the uncertain force of the delega-
tion doctrine today when it noted that "the delegation dcctrine remains valid law, but ... its scope
must be determined on the basis of the deferential post-Schechter cases decided by the Supreme
Court." Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (per curiam)
(dictum), affd on other grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). In Bowsher v.
Synar, the majority of the Supreme Court declined to reach the delegation issue. 106 S. Ct. at 3193
n.10.
Although courts have rarely invalidated acts of Congress on grounds of excessive delegation, they
have frequently held that agency actions taken pursuant to delegated authority were not in fact au-
thorized by the statutes, especially when the actions intrude on fundamental rights. See, e.g., Lowe v.
SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207-11 (1985) (SEC not authorized to regulate newsletters offering investment
advice to general public); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (Secretary of State not authorized
to withhold passport because of citizens' political activities).
39. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (Secretary of Agriculture authorized to establish
standards for grading tobacco); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) (Secretary of
War authorized to determine whether bridges were unreasonable obstructions to navigation on na-
tion's waterways).
40. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968) (agencies must be allowed to
adapt rules to changing circumstances); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
219 (1943) (field of regulation, radio, was "new and dynamic").
41. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 933 (intolerable system of private bills led Congress to dele-
gate to Attorney General authority to suspend deportation in hardship cases); J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. at 407 ("If Congress were to be required to fix every rate, it would be
impossible to exercise the power at all.").
42. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(agency rule arbitrary when it relies on factors that Congress did not intend it to consider).
43. Cf. id. at 58-59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agency did not act
arbitrarily when it revoked regulation requiring passive restraints in automobiles because Congress
had not explicitly required such restraints but had ordered agency to regulate under general "safety"
standard; agency had not refused to enforce specific policy command by Congress but had acted under
discretion granted in delegation statute).
44. The term "standards" was used by the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 423 (1944); "intelligible principle" is from J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
at 409. In a few cases, the Supreme Court has upheld standardless delegations where the transfer of
authority was to an entity possessing substantial inherent power in the regulated field. Delegation to
the President of congressional authority touching foreign affairs is the classic example. See United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Similarly, the Court upheld a standard-
less delegation to Indian tribes of the power to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages on reservations.
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). The Court concluded that the tribes' independent
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delegated authority to pursue objectives different from those that Congress
intended.
The item veto presumes to ensure that Congress will be ineffective
when appropriating extravagantly or for special interests. It would en-
courage the President to do exactly what courts ordinarily forbid him' 6
and other officials to do: alter or even nullify a congressional mandate. If
Congress wishes to enlist the executive's assistance in reducing waste, it
has a permissible method of so doing; it can budget in lump sums rather
than line items and thus leave the executive to determine how funds
within an account should be allocated.4 In lump-sum appropriations,
Congress does not express a binding preference for specific programs by
budgeting especially for them; the President and agencies are free to allo-
cate monies as they think appropriate.""
In contrast, the item veto allows the President to disregard specific pol-
icy commands of Congress. The President could nullify not only items in
appropriation acts but also programs previously enacted in substantive
legislation that receive their funding through the regular appropriation
process. The item veto would thus abrogate by legislation the President's
power over "internal and social relations of tribal life" was sufficient to justify a standardless delega-
tion in that area, id. at 557, just as Congress may delegate to the states its power to regulate a field
over which both Congress and the states possess regulatory authority. Cf. Northeast Bancorp v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 168, 174 (1985) (Congress intended that state
law govern permissibility of interstate bank acquisitions).
The appropriation power is not a field in which the President possesses independent authority. The
Constitution requires that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see E. CORWIN, THE CoNs-rrtrrioN AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 133 (14th ed. 1978) (clause "obviously addressed to the Executive"); see
also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3208 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("[A]ppropriating funds
is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress . . . ."). But see Letter
from Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti to President Jimmy Carter (Jan. 16, 1981), reprinted in
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FUNDING GAPS JEOPARDIZE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OPERA-
TIONS 76-92 (1981) (suggesting that President may have authority to appropriate funds to fulfill
functions derived directly from Constitution, such as "the conduct of foreign relations essential to the
national security," id. at 85 n.10).
45. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114-16 (1976) (authorization to Civil Service
Commission to "promote the efficiency of the Service" did not justify policy of excluding aliens from
Service); FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 93-95 (1953) (FCC authority to regulate radio
in "public interest" did not justify encouraging competition wherever possible).
46. Dissenting from the Court's holding in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935),
Justice Cardozo argued that article III courts could not review presidential actions with the same
freedom that they possessed to review actions by officials. See id. at 447. Nonetheless courts have
invalidated Executive Orders for lack of conformity to standards set out in the delegating statute. See,
e.g., Levy v. Urbach, 651 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1981); Day v. United States, 611 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1980).
47. UAW v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
81 (1985).
48. UAW v. Donovan, 746 F.2d at 861; LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307, 318 (1975);
see Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45 (1975) ("[Llegislative intention, without more, is not
legislation.").
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constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed;49 it
would also reduce Congress from legislature to adviser.
2. The Item Veto Contrasted with Permissible Delegations
Although the Supreme Court's delegation cases are not easily harmo-
nized, it is possible to discern three kinds of delegations that the Court has
recognized as proper. The executive has enjoyed spending power corre-
sponding to all three kinds. The impermissibility of the item veto is high-
lighted by contrast with these permissible delegations.
a. Fact-Finding
Congress can make the operation of a law contingent upon some future
occurrence and charge the executive with the responsibility of deciding
whether that event has taken place.50 This duty may require the exercise
of substantial judgment; the delegate may, for example, have to evaluate
complex economic factors in determining whether the relevant event has
occurred.
51
This delegation of fact-finding and fact-evaluating lay at the heart of
the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law.5 Presidential budget-cutting
occurred when the Comptroller General determined, after assessing the
likely revenues for the next year, that the budget deficit would exceed the
amount permitted for that year. The Comptroller General was directed to
use his judgment strictly in pursuance of Congress' policy; he could order
cuts only if the deficit exceeded the level permitted by statute and only by
the amount necessary to reduce the deficit to that level.5" Congress had
made the important decisions about the incidence and extent of budget
reductions. 54 This legislative direction, which the Comptroller General
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
50. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
51. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator,
312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
52. Public Debt Limit-Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1037 (codified in relevant part at 2
U.S.C. §§ 901-907 (Supp. III 1985)), held unconstitutional in part, Synar v. United States, 626 F.
Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (per curiam), affd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181 (1986). The district court opinion declaring Gramm-Rudman unconstitutional placed that dele-
gation squarely in the line of "contingent legislation" cases. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at
1387 (dictum). But ef. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future,
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 196 n.44 (1986) (arguing that district court ignored or misunder-
stood crucial distinction between "real" contingencies such as economic conditions and contingencies
that Congress itself creates, such as its failure to legislate).
53. 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3), (c)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
54. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1389 (noting that "Comptroller General is not
made responsible for a single policy judgment") (emphasis omitted); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. at 3208 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) (embracing district court's analysis of delegation issues); id. at
3215 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same).
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had no power to disregard, contrasts sharply with the independent policy
judgment that the President would exercise if the same objective of fiscal
discipline were sought through an item veto.
b. Subsidiary Policy-Making
Congress frequently delegates to the executive the responsibility for
making subsidiary policy decisions to effect Congress' general wishes in a
particular field. This power to make subsidiary policy is a feature of the
executive's authority to decide how funds within budget accounts should
be spent.55 Moreover, the use of lump sums rather than line items allows
the executive to "reprogram" funds in an emergency without having to
ask Congress for a formal reappropriation.56
Even when Congress has allowed the executive to "transfer" funds be-
tween budget accounts, it has done so under the assumption that such
transfer authority would be used to save programs that would otherwise
perish because Congress had appropriated too little or was unable to an-
ticipate unforeseen developments. 57 Such delegations do not amount to ex-
ecutive license to reorder congressional priorities by deciding that some
programs are not worthy of funding. Rather they require the executive to
use its discretion to preserve the congressional purpose.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
56. See Fisher, Reprogramming of Funds by the Defense Department, 36 J. POL. 77, 78 (1974).
"Reprogramming" of funds within budget accounts must be distinguished from "transfer" of funds
between the accounts specifically set out in appropriation acts. Transfer is prohibited unless pursuant
to congressional authorization. See id.
57. In 1809, after two decades of struggle between the Federalists and Republicans over the exis-
tence of what Hamilton claimed as an inherent executive power to transfer funds between budget
accounts, Congress simultaneously authorized the President to transfer funds when it was out of ses-
sion and when "necessary for the public service" and prohibited the President from transferring funds
while it sat. By placing a restriction on presidential transfer authority, Congress rejected the claim of
inherent presidential transfer authority. See L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 101-02
(1975).
Moreover, the political background of the 1809 settlement indicates quite clearly that the purpose
of the discretionary grant was to allow the President the means to save programs, not to terminate
them. During the first two decades Congress enacted appropriation acts with highly specific line
items; in 1793, for example, the general appropriation act included such accounts as $34,856 for
forage for the War Department, $1500 for the purchase of hydrometers, and $450 for firewood,
stationery, and printing in the Treasurer's office. See Act of Feb. 28, 1793, § 1, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 325,
327-28. That emphasis on detail was justified by one member of Congress as a safeguard against the
possibility that the head of a department would apply lump-sum appropriations as he wished and not
in respect of the policy preferences expressed by Congress-in short, a departmental item veto. See L.
WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER 24 (1943). Constant executive over-spending in some accounts,
or, from the other perspective, congressional mistakes in budgeting, led the executive to seek transfer
authority so that departments would not have to cease operations during Congress' long absences from
Washington if congressional appropriations proved insufficient. See generally id. ch. 2. The govern-
ment's emphasis was always on the necessity of executive flexibility to save programs in the light of
unforeseeable circumstances, particularly because of Congress' obsession with detailed appropriation
acts. No commentator has suggested that Hamilton claimed transfer authority as a source of power to
terminate congressional programs because the executive thought them unwise, or that Congress so
intended the discretion that it gave to the executive.
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c. Individual Cases
Some delegations reflect the necessity of entrusting the executive with
authority to make fact-specific decisions as to whether the enforcement of
a law, in a particular case, is appropriate. Congress can empower the
agency charged with the enforcement of a statute to grant mitigation or
exemption from its operation.5" There is, of course, a danger that the ex-
ecutive will abuse this discretion, but Congress does not expect the execu-
tive to sabotage the statutory policy by refusing to enforce it at all.
Thus Congress has allowed agencies not to spend the full amount of
funding granted in an appropriation act where savings are possible with-
out a threat to the program's effectiveness, 59 and it has permitted the
President to defer obligations if disbursement at a later time within the
authorized period will better serve the appropriation's purpose or save
money.60 This limited power to withhold funding does not threaten the
fundamentals of congressional policy. Congress understands that it bud-
gets well in advance of the expected obligation of the funds and that esti-
mates of agency needs may be faulty.61 This authorization to make sav-
ings at the margin does not empower the executive to "save" until the
program becomes unenforceable. 62 On the contrary, Congress assumes
that the program will receive funding at some time and level that will
ensure its effectiveness.
Developments also may arise that make disbursement of the funds con-
trary to the stated congressional purpose. During the impoundment con-
58. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 933 (1983); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
59. See 31 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1)-(2) (1982) (Antideficiency Act) (current version); State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1118 (8th Cir. 1973) (previous version of Antideficiency Act did
not permit executive to thwart congressional policy) (dictum); City of New Haven v. United States,
634 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 n.8 (D.D.C. 1986) (Congress intended revision of Antideficiency Act to
prohibit its use as "instrument of policy-making").
60. Until recently, the President had the power to defer expenditure of appropriations under a
provision of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. See 2 U.S.C. § 684(a) (1982).
The exercise of this deferral power was subject to a legislative veto. Id. § 684(b). The deferral author-
ity was held inseverable from the unconstitutional legislative veto and invalidated in City of New
Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). The court accepted the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the deferral power constituted a delegation, albeit a circumscribed one, of the legislative
spending power. See id. at 1457; cf R. Ehlke, Legal Analysis of Proposal to Repeal Deferral Author-
ity under the Impoundment Control Act (Congressional Research Service Apr. 2, 1986) (arguing that
Impoundment Control Act is not delegation of deferral authority but procedural mechanism for con-
trolling deferral authority, which must stem from some other delegating act of Congress); Maine v.
Goldschmidt, 494 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (D. Me. 1980) (same).
61. See Fisher, supra note 56, at 78.
62. See Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment at 9-11, City of New Haven v.
United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 86-0455) (Department of Justice arguing that
deferral authority is not like item veto because "the expenditure of the money is simply delayed"); cf.
Note, Addressing the Resurgence of Presidential Budgetmaking Initiative: A Proposal to Reform the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 63 TEx. L. REv. 693, 715 & n.134 (1984) (discussing potential
for executive manipulations of deferral authority to defeat programs' purposes).
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troversy, a court allowed HUD to suspend a housing subsidy program
designed to give subsidies to the poor when the recipients were clearly
middle-class.6 3 Yet even this rescission did not change Congress' priorities;
rather, the court ratified an executive decision not to enforce a program
once it became apparent that the program was not achieving the very pur-
pose declared for it by Congress in the act itself.
3. The Special Nature of the Spending Power
The special nature of Congress' spending power and of the spending
decisions that Congress must make further demonstrates the impropriety
of the item veto. First, the exercise of all of Congress' other legislative
powers depends for its effectiveness on funding; Congress must tax and
spend to do anything. The appropriation process is really a means by
which the legislature assigns priority among its programs." A transfer of
spending power to the President would give him primary authority to set
priorities for legislation. Second, as the Framers understood it, the legisla-
ture possessed the power of the purse as a guard against executive power.
The spending power, as well as other congressional powers such as im-
peachment, is a legislative guard against executive misfeasance."5 The
spending power is thus a "core" legislative power. 86
Finally, the essence of all budgeting, not just pork-barrelling, is legisla-
tion for diverse interests.67 Apportioning the fisc requires hearing from
interested recipients, assessing the validity of the conflicting demands, and
coordinating all the programs in a compromise package. Only Congress
can adequately balance these interests, for its size allows it to bring to
policy-making a diversity of opinion, reflecting that of the members' con-
63. See Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
64. See UAW v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 81
(1985).
65. For ratification-era characterizations of the power of the purse as a check on the executive, see
13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITrTION, supra note 31, at
251 (Tench Coxe's essay on Presidency noting curb on presidential power in lack of control over fisc);
THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359-60 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For a recent telling exam-
ple of the use of the spending power to curb executive misbehavior, see How to Get Attention, N.Y.
Times, July 12, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (Sen. Weicker's introduction of provision cutting Attorney General
Meese's travel budget prompted justice Department to negotiate for improvement of Connecticut
schools for retarded).
66. The district court invalidating Gramm-Rudman rejected this characterization of the spending
power and suggested that there were no greater constitutional limits on delegation of the spending
power than any other congressional power. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1385 (D.D.C.)
(three-judge court) (per curiam) (dictum), affd on other grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. 3181 (1986).
67. It has not escaped commentators' attention that, possibly, what the people really want from
budgeting is pork barrel. See, e.g., D. STOCKMAN, supra note 11, at 390-94 (arguing that Reagan
Revolution failed to bring about fiscal discipline because members of Congress correctly understood
that United States had opted for appropriations based on governmental subsidies and largesse).
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stituents, that the President cannot have. 8 In the presence of this diversity
Congress can appreciate the trade-offs necessary in budgeting and make
informed decisions about the national priorities. The item veto would de-
liver these decisions into the hands of only one policy-maker. Moreover,
whereas the item veto's supporters claim a "national interest" perspective
for the President, the President is no less likely than members of Congress
to pursue partisan objectives, and his item veto may well exclude the in-
terests of many voters whose opinions are better represented in
Congress."9
II. THE "RULES" ITEM VETO
A third item-veto proposal that has received considerable support in the
Senate would avoid the delegation problems posed by the "impoundment"
and "conventional" item vetoes but would achieve the desired close presi-
dential review of appropriation measures through new internal congres-
sional procedures for the passage of appropriation acts. After an appropri-
ation bill passed both houses in the same form, the clerk of the house in
which the bill originated would separate it into its component "items" and
enroll each "item" as an individual bill for presentment to the President.
The President would have no power to parse bills in their signing or en-
forcing; Congress would not be delegating any of its power over the ap-
propriation process to the President because it would still be responsible
for deciding the content of each item, and therefore of each resultant bill.
If both houses so wished, they could still place nongermane riders or "log-
roll" appropriations within the items and thus have them enacted into
law,70 but absent such a determined posture on the part of Congress, this
68. Madison defended against the Anti-Federalist attack that the House of Representatives was
too small to be representative of the popular will by predicting rapid growth in the number of mem-
bers of the House as the country's population increased. See THE FEDERAmST No. 55. Although
Madison felt that the House need not be so large as to assure the members' familiarity with minutiae
of the constituency's character, he conceded the importance of representing the nation's diverse inter-
ests in Congress and assured his readers that a ratio of 30,000 inhabitants to each representative
would provide competent representation of local interests.
69. Opponents of the item veto have frequently urged that the use of the power will probably
reflect partisan, not national, interests. See, e.g., Edwards, The Case Against the Line-Item Veto, 1
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 191, 193 (1985).
70. One of the "rules" item veto's supporters recognizes this as a possible source of weakness in
the proposal. See J. Best, Objections to the Item Veto Considered, reprinted in S. REP. No. 92, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also J. Killian, Constitutional Questions
Raised by S. 43 in Establishing Item Veto, reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra, at 18 (noting that
Congress would retain control over composition of each item); SENATE REPORT, supra, at 32 (addi-
tional views of Sens. Dole, Warner, Garn) (same). The "rules" item-veto bill considered by Congress
in 1985, S. 43, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1985 Hearings, supra note 6, would define
an "item" as any unnumbered section in an appropriation bill. But Congress has already demon-
strated that it could easily evade such a definition of "item"; it passed an appropriation act in the
form of one long unsectioned paragraph in 1793. See Act of Feb. 28, 1793, §1, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 325,
325-28.
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procedural or "rules" item veto would afford the President great influence
over federal appropriations.7 '
The power to enact such drastic changes in congressional procedure
rests in the constitutional authority of the houses to "determine the rules
of [their] proceedings." 72 Courts construing the rules clause have allowed
the houses broad discretion, characterizing the houses' power over their
procedures in expansive terms.73 But if the rules power gives to Congress
the authority to promulgate the item veto, the plenary nature of the power
also ensures that the "rules" item veto cannot impose effective institutional
safeguards against budgetary indiscipline.
In exercising its rules power, a house can normally repeal or suspend
its rules by one-house resolution, without the concurrence of the other
house or the President.74 As proposed by the item veto's supporters, how-
ever, the "rules" item veto would be promulgated by statute. Because re-
71. 1985 Hearings, supra note 6, at 81-82 (statement of Louis Fisher) (noting that President
could apply pressure on members of Congress with interests in particular items of appropriation).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; see J. Best, Objections to the Item Veto Considered, reprinted in
SENATE REPORT, supra note 70, at 24 (suggesting rules clause as authority for establishing item
veto). The House currently employs a procedural mechanism similar to the one proposed in S. 43, see
supra notes 6, 70, to avoid voting on bills to raise the ceiling on the national debt. Under the so-called
"Gephardt rule," the House votes on the concurrent budget resolution (which is never -presented to
the President and never acquires the force of law); the part of the budget resolution containing the
debt-ceiling measure is then detached from the rest of the resolution and "deemed" to have passed the
House. Thus the House never considers a bill containing only the debt ceiling. 43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1788 (1985) (discussing Gephardt rule); see also 2 U.S.C. § 632(a)(5) (Supp. III 1985) (public
debt to be part of concurrent budget resolution); 131 CONG. REc. S135-36 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985)
(statement of Sen. Mattingly) (relying on Gephardt rule to argue validity of S. 43).
In any case, the "enrolled bill" rule announced in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-73 (1892),
provides a conclusive presumption that a bill has passed both houses of Congress if the houses attest to
that fact. This rule, based on "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments" by the
judiciary, id. at 672, permits Congress to set its own methods for determining whether a bill has
passed a house. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1892) (rejecting challenge brought
against revenue act as invalid on account of lack of quorum in House; House can freely set its rules
for determining existence of quorum).
73. The first Supreme Court decision to consider the scope of the rules power was United States
v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). The Court described the power thus:
[AII1 matters of method are open to the determination of the house, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the house, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Id. at 5.
74. Research fails to disclose a single instance of enforcement of an internal rule of Congress by
the executive branch through the courts. In United States v. Eilberg, 507 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa.
1980), the government brought a civil suit against Representative Eilberg to recover the cost of per-
sonal telephone calls allegedly charged to the government. Eilberg moved to dismiss on the grounds
that no statute, only a House rule, prohibited such acts. The government disagreed but conceded that
"'[e]nforcement of a purely internal House rule by the executive and courts would be an encroach-
ment on the powers of the House, a violation of the separation of powers, and a violation of the
textual commitment clause [sic].'" Id. at 276 (quoting Reply to Memorandum Filed by the Clerk of
the United States House of Representatives at 4).
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peal of a statute requires the concurrence of both houses and the Presi-
dent,"8 the proponents of the "rules" item veto apparently view the
procedures to be promulgated in the bill as binding on the houses until
statutory repeal; e neither house could alter its budget procedures on its
own.
This Note argues that, just as either house may renounce procedures
promulgated in internal rules by one-house resolution, so too may it aban-
don a procedure contained in a statute. The requirements of bicameralism
and presentment do not apply to the repeal of congressional procedures.
First, such statutory actions are not legislative acts; the houses are not
governing the nation, but only themselves. Second, Congress cannot
abridge the powers that the houses exercise independently of each other.
Third, just as a legislature cannot alienate its legislative powers, neither
should the houses be able to alienate the powers that they exercise ancil-
lary to the process of lawmaking.
A. The Rules Power as Distinct from Legislative Power
Article I, section 7 requires the concurrence of both houses and the
President before a bill can acquire the force of law.7 7 Not all of the
houses' acts are legislative, however. What constitutes legislative activity is
not easy to define, but the term certainly refers primarily to the promul-
gation of rules of conduct binding on the general public, not on members
of Congress themselves.78 In INS v. Chadha,79 the Supreme Court recog-
nized the distinction between self-governance and governance of others.
The Chadha Court noted that whereas the houses of Congress have the
power to set their own rules without each other's consent,80 the one-house
legislative veto violated the bicameralism requirement because it was legis-
75. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
76. The "rules" item-veto bill considered by the Senate in 1985 included a two-year sunset clause;
thus the proposal was "experimental" and could be abandoned after the trial period. Such a provision
would be unnecessary if the procedures could be renounced at any time by either house. Moreover,
the proposal is made not with sunset in mind but with the "clear intention of renewing and institu-
tionalizing it if it passes the test of experience." J. Best, Objections to the Item Veto Considered,
reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 70, at 30.
77. See supra note 3.
78. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3194-204 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(contrasting requirement that "when Congress. . . seeks to make policy that will bind the Nation, it
must follow the procedures mandated by Article I," id. at 3194, with fact that "Members themselves
necessarily engage in many activities that are merely ancillary to their primary responsibilities[;]...
they make rules for the governance of their own business," id. at 3202-03).
79. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80. Id. at 956 n.21. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Chadha Court that the houses' power over
their internal rules empowers Congress to "bind itself." Id. It is not clear whether the Court was
expressing an opinion that Congress could make its rules unrepealable, or whether it was using the
term "bind" to refer to Congress' ability to set rules for itself, just as Congress "binds" the public
when it enacts rules of general application.
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lative in character; it had "the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . all outside the Legislative
Branch."81
The First Congress also recognized this distinction."2 In August 1789
the houses adopted joint rules establishing a method for the enrollment of
bills for presentment to the President," but the Congress never presented
these joint rules to the President for signature. A committee report of the
Fifty-fourth Congress, considering this action of the First Congress in ret-
rospect, noted that the First Congress did not consider presentment neces-
sary because "the subject matter [of the joint rules] was not legislation per
se." '84 Congress could dispense with presidential approval, not because the
procedures had been enacted as rules rather than statutes, but because
their substance was not legislation.85 Because the substance of the "rules"
item veto is a new procedure for considering and passing appropriation
bills, neither its promulgation nor its repeal requires presentment to the
President. 6
B. The RulesPower as Unabridgeable by Congress
The rules power is one of several powers that the houses possess inde-
pendently to make their legislative powers effective. The House of Repre-
sentatives and the courts have long maintained that a house's power to
exercise its ancillary functions cannot be abridged by a statute passed by
both houses and signed by the President that attempts to channel or regu-
late those powers. When the Thirty-first Congress considered a law to
provide for the taking of testimony in contested elections, members of the
House were concerned that the statute might restrict each house's inde-
81. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
82. The Supreme Court has several times expressed the view that actions taken by the First
Congress relating to specific parts of the Constitution are highly probative of the intent of the Fram-
ers. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3187 & n.3 (listing 20 members of First Congress who were
also delegates at Constitutional Convention); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (legisla-
tive chaplaincy does not violate establishment clause because First Congress appointed chaplain for
itself); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1928) (Congress has
power to lay import taxes for purpose of protecting domestic industry). But see Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding unconstitutional portion of Judiciary Act of 1789, passed by
First Congress, because it increased original jurisdiction of Supreme Court beyond that expressly
provided by Constitution).
83. The practice of promulgating procedures for the two houses by joint rules was common until
1876. See 5 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 355, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6782 (1907) [hereinafter A. HINDS]. Today the proce-
dures for the enrollment of bills are set forth by statute. See 1 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
84. S. REP. No. 135, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1897).
85. See id. at 8.
86. See Kreeger Farms Home Dairy, Inc. v. Block, No. 85-5896, memorandum op. at 3 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 23, 1986) (President's signature unnecessary for portions of Congressional Budget Act af-
fecting internal congressional procedures), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 176 (1986).
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pendent power to judge its elections, so Congress expressly reserved to the
houses the right to disregard the time limits set forth in the statute. Rep-
resentative Strong, speaking in favor of the bill, assured the House that
such a saving provision was not even necessary: "The right of the House
[to judge its elections] ...cannot be restricted [by law] and I do not
propose that it should be restricted.1 87 The Thirty-fifth Congress relied
on these remarks to disregard altogether the restrictions of the act. Repre-
sentative Boyce of the Committee on Elections argued that "[b]y the Con-
stitution, the House is made the 'judge of the elections, returns, and quali-
fications of its own members.' This power being granted by the
Constitution is above all law, and cannot be taken away or impaired by
any law."88
Court constructions of other ancillary powers of the houses have estab-
lished that Congress cannot abridge them by statute. The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the argument, made to attack a contempt conviction,
that Congress "exhausted" the Senate's power to investigate the Teapot
Dome scandal when the two houses by statute directed the President to do
so." In a later case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals put the principle
yet more forcefully. A statute requiring that "all offices attached to the
seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia" did not
preclude a Senator from holding a hearing in Lincoln, Nebraska, for "ei-
ther .house has the constitutional power to conduct separate investigations
for proper purposes, and the Congress has no authority to limit the future
exercise of that power."90
Nor is a house's power to expel a member affected, constrained, or au-
tomatically triggered by the member's imprisonment for the commission of
a federal crime.' 1 The power to expel members, not a legislative power
but an ancillary one, remains available to each house alone, notwithstand-
87. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1851). The Fifth Congress had enacted statutory
procedures for the taking of testimony in contested elections. Members of the House had expressed
doubts about the binding nature of the statute, arguing that the law was an application of the houses'
powers over their own rules and elections, and that no house could abridge such powers of a later
house. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 683-84 (1797). Representative Harper, of the committee that re-
ported the bill, defended it as binding because it prescribed no internal rules but created a procedure
outside the House binding "on the whole community." See 1 [MISCELLANEOUS] AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS 160 (W. Lowrie & W. Franklin eds. 1834); see also supra notes 79-85 and accompanying
text (discussing distinction between regulation of internal congressional procedures and general regu-
lation of society). By 1858, the House had abandoned this original internal/external distinction in
favor of a broader view that the ancillary powers of the house, even those affecting outsiders such as
the power to judge elections, could not be abridged by statute. See infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
88. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 725 (1858) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 5). Representative Boyce's view has become that of the House Parliamentarian, at least. See I A.
HINDS, supra note 83, § 82.
89. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929).
90. Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 1935).
91. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
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ing the houses' acting in concert to pass the criminal statute. A member in
prison is a member until his house says otherwise; "[tihe seat into which
he was originally inducted . . . could only become vacant . . .by some
direct action on the part of the Senate in the exercise of its constitutional
powers."92
Similarly, the enactment of a criminal statute to punish contempt of
Congress did not withdraw from the houses the power to punish contempt
on their own.9" Although Congress could legislate to make contempt a
criminal act, it did not follow that a citation by the House for contempt
was a legislative act; if it were, then the concurrence of the Senate and the
approval of the President would be necessary. The contempt power is "in-
cidental to the legislative function," an "attribute of the power to legis-
late," and always retained by the houses.94 The rules power, like the con-
tempt power, is ancillary to each house's exercise of legislative power and
cannot be abridged by other entities.
C. The Rules Power as Unabridgeable by Earlier Houses
On some occasions when Congress has enacted procedural measures in
statutes, it has expressly reserved to the houses the right to amend these
rules.' 5 Such saving clauses are not necessary. Even a single house acting
alone cannot restrict the freedom of its successors to exercise its ancillary
powers. The houses may not be limited in the exercise of the powers that
the Constitution grants them. 6
Analogously, the Constitution vests the power of lawmaking in the two
houses and the President; those three institutions are always free to exer-
cise the legislative power, subject only to constitutional limits. Generally, a
92. Id. at 369.
93. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897). The power to hold witnesses in contempt is
not a "general" power of Congress but is derivative of the powers of investigation and legislation. See
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 197 (1881). Therefore, if the investigation being conducted
does not concern a proper subject of legislation, the house has no power to cite for contempt a witness
who refuses to cooperate. See Jurney v. Mac~racken, 294 U.S. 125, 147-48 (1935); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74 (1927); cf In re Cox Cotton Co., 24 Bankr. 930, 948 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1982) (courts have inherent power to hold parties in contempt but Congress does not).
94. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 160-61, 173-74.
95. See, e.g., Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (saving
clause in Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act); Krebs v. Ashbrook, 275 F. Supp. 111, 114
(D.D.C. i967) (three-judge court) (relying on saving clause to decide that house rule contained in
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was not "Act of Congress" for purpose of convening three-
judge court to hear constitutional challenges to acts of Congress, as required by jurisdictional statute);
123 CONG. REc. 36,309-11 (1977) (House suspending procedural provisions of Congressional Budget
Act); 121 CONG. REc. 7678-79 (1975) (same).
96. See Kreeger Farms Home Dairy, Inc. v. Block, No. 85-5896, memorandum op. at 3 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 23, 1986) (court had "grave doubts" whether Congress through legislation could set rules
for later Congresses that could be changed only through legislation), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 176
(1986).
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legislature may not grant a party an interest in preventing the passage,
amendment, or repeal of any law.97 The ban against making any law
unrepealable finds expression in the maxim Salus populi suprema lex
(The welfare of the people is the highest law).9" Salus populi suprema
lex is not a statement of crude Utilitarianism; it is consonant with binding
limits on the exercise of any power by the legislature, but only if those
limits are placed by the people in a constitution and not imposed by the
legislature itself.99
As the ban against unrepealability of statutes guarantees a legislature's
full discretion to exercise its power to enact laws, so does a ban against
unrepealability of procedures protect a house's discretion in its constitu-
tional authority to set a legislative agenda, arrange for the manner of con-
sidering bills, and thus assign priority to the subjects before it. Adoption
of the "rules" item veto would reflect a house's decision to defer substan-
tially to the President's judgment in appropriation matters. Reversion to
the current regime would be desirable when a house intended to assume
greater responsibility for spending decisions, but if the "rules" item veto
were binding on a house, it could not reassert its full authority in that
area. The houses must be able to make decisions freely as to the relative
importance of issues requiring legislation, for "the power to choose sub-
jects for legislation is a fundamental attribute of legislative power."100
The ancillary powers guarantee the houses' effectiveness as institutions
in the tripartite system of enacting laws; they may be "put on the
[houses'] right to function."' 01 To allow another branch or an earlier
house to restrict the exercise of these powers would undermine their very
97. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985) (no due process right to prevent Congress
from adjusting AFDC benefit levels); Chase Securities Corp v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945)
(statute of limitations was matter of legislative grace, and its repeal did not deny due process to
defendant in civil case); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932) (Congress could alter by statute
provisions for uses of park set forth in earlier statute); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878)
(grant of charter to beer company did not prevent state from later prohibiting sale of alcohol); Rector
of Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 300 (1861) (church had no interest in
continued enforcement of statute exempting it from taxation); Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853) (charter granting insurance company exemption from taxation did not
prevent state legislature from taxing it).
98. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. at 33. Montesquieu cited the maxim to support the prohi-
bition against the unrepealability of any law. "When, by some Circumstance, the political Law be-
comes destructive to the State, we ought to decide by such a political law as will preserve it." 2 M. DE
MONTESQUIEU, WORKS 231 (London 1777).
99. Thus a state constitution could authorize the legislature to contract away the right to tax
parties, and any subsequent attempt to tax them would be void. See Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 428-30.
100. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 785 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
101. Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620, 625 (S.D. Ohio 1924) (describing contempt power), rev'd
on other grounds sub nor. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
Vol. 96: 838, 1987
Presidential Item Veto
purpose. They stem directly from the Constitution and as such are above
statutory abridgment and limited only by other constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
To instill fiscal discipline in the federal government, proponents of the
item veto seek to restrict the effectiveness of Congress' spending power
either directly or by constraining the discretion of the houses in their
power over their own procedures. Such restrictions would undermine the
effectiveness that the Framers understood as inhering in the legislature's
appropriation power or would diminish the role that the houses play in
lawmaking. Congress cannot constitutionally seek to solve its budget
problems by attempting to divest itself of its constitutionally assigned
powers.
